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This article unpacks the rise and fall of Canadian campaigns to annex Britain’s 
West Indian colonies during the First World War to underscore the significance 
of the West Indies and the rise of transnational Black resistance to Canada’s 
evolving autonomy in the British Empire. It suggests that the war-time struggle 
for Canadian autonomy was a racially-inscribed project whose outcome was 
contingent on the increasingly fraught relations between white Canadians and 
West Indians of colour. By inserting the West Indies and West Indian struggles for 
racial justice in the war-time discourse of Canadian autonomy, the article places 
an important war-time social formation in dialogue with a subject that is normally 
explored in the analytic confines of diplomatic and constitutional histories. 
Le présent article expose la montée et la chute des campagnes canadiennes visant 
à annexer les colonies britanniques des Indes occidentales au cours de la Première 
Guerre mondiale afin de souligner l’importance des Antilles britanniques et la 
montée de la résistance transnationale des Noirs en ce qui a trait à l’évolution de 
l’autonomie du Canada au sein de l’Empire britannique. L’auteure suggère que la 
lutte pour l’autonomie canadienne pendant la guerre était un projet à motivation 
raciale dont l’issue dépendait des relations de plus en plus tendues entre les 
Blancs canadiens et les Antillais noirs. En évoquant les Antilles britanniques et 
les luttes en faveur de la justice raciale de ces îles dans le discours de guerre sur 
l’autonomie canadienne, l’article replace un élément important de la formation 
sociale du temps de la guerre en dialogue avec un sujet qui se limite normalement 
à l’histoire diplomatique et constitutionnelle.
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DURING THE FIRST World War, hundreds of West Indians migrated to Canada 
to join the Canadian armed forces, to meet the labour demands created by 
wartime economic expansion and the absence of enlisted workers, and to study 
at Canadian universities. Reporting on the Jamaicans who had made their way to 
Halifax in 1916 to enlist, Jamaica’s Daily Gleaner editor Herbert DeLisser waxed 
sentimental about their warm reception in Canada: “There is now at Halifax some 
one hundred and six of our men, and it is known that they could not be kindlier 
treated if they were at home. Kindness and sympathy is [sic] extended to them; 
and this indeed was to be expected from the Canadian people, one of the most 
homely, kindly and courteous peoples we have ever had the pleasure of travelling 
amongst.” To Delisser, the increased migration of West Indians to Canada during 
the war was a testament to Canada’s connection to Jamaica—a connection that, in 
his assessment, might soon transform into some form of political and commercial 
federation. After the war, he continued, “Canada will make a bid for tropical 
provinces on lines that will do no violence to the feelings of West Indians and no 
injury to their material interests.”1
 A Jamaican of African and Jewish descent, DeLisser was actively involved in 
the island’s cultural life and commercial development until his death in 1944.2 His 
speculation about the possibility of a “Greater Canada” that included the British 
West Indies was part of the global interest in the territorial changes expected after 
the war, an interest first aroused by the Allied occupation of German colonies in 
the early years of the conflict. The other dominions—Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa—had either occupied or laid claim to German territory in the 
South Pacific and southwest Africa, so it seemed appropriate that Canada—the 
oldest and largest dominion—should also obtain new possessions. “During the 
next generations,” DeLisser wrote, “that portion of the King’s self-governing 
dominions will devote itself to exploiting the resources of what amounts to a 
tropical empire ... the Canadians, believing that they have a great future in the 
world, have for some time past been wishing for some portion of the tropics 
that should be a complement to their magnificent country.” While Canada might 
“exploit” West Indian resources, DeLisser was confident it would be a mutually 
advantageous federation based on respect and shared imperial sentiment. In 
bringing the Empire’s vast peoples together in the service of a noble cause, the 
war had created “a homogenous feeling ... a oneness of outlook” that suggested “a 
reorganization of Imperial relationships” after the war.3
 DeLisser’s musings about a postwar federation of Canada and the British West 
Indies were more than just fanciful journalism. A few months after he published 
his editorial on the subject, Canada’s Department of State, at the request of Prime 
Minister Robert Borden, released a nine-page report to the Canadian Cabinet 
entitled “Confidential Memorandum upon the Subject of the Annexation of the 
1 Daily Gleaner [Jamaica], April 12, 1916.
2 National Library of Jamaica, Kingston, Biographical Notes Collection, Herbert George DeLisser. See also 
W. Adolphe Roberts, Biographical Sketches of Six Great Jamaicans (Kingston, Jamaica: Pioneer Press, 
1952), pp. 104-122.
3 Daily Gleaner [Jamaica], April 12, 1916.
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West India Islands to the Dominion of Canada.” According to the report, the 
absence of German colonies in the Americas—which no doubt relieved Canadians 
at the outbreak of war—placed Canada at a distinct disadvantage in the scramble 
for postwar accessions. As territorial readjustments were being discussed in 
London, Paris, and Washington, it “behooves Canada to consider in what measure 
she can best secure an equivalent to those territorial advantages which she will be 
glad to see her sister Dominions acquire.” These advantages included free access 
to tropical products, a large, secure market for Canadian exports, the development 
of Canadian sea power—a vital prerequisite to administer, trade with, and protect 
geographically isolated islands and a long-term goal of Borden’s government—
and the national prestige associated with governing “subject races.”4
 Acquisition of these territorial concessions was all the more urgent during 
the war given the United States’ growing influence in the region. In the years 
immediately following the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 (which 
heightened the estimated value of the Caribbean world-wide), the United States 
intervened in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and purchased the Danish West 
Indies. Canada’s annexation of the British West Indies thus provided a means 
to check American influence in the hemisphere. It also promised to secure trade 
relationships made volatile by the war. The war had cut off European trade with 
central and South America, which presented opportunities for the expansion of 
trade between North and South America. The “great rivalry of the future will be 
for control of the tropics,” remarked one Canadian contemporary in October 1918, 
and there was no more compelling indicator of this trend than the United States’ 
recent expansion in the Caribbean.5
 The war-time campaign for the federation of Canada and the British West Indies 
has been documented in studies by P. J. Wigley, Robin Winks, Brinsley Samaroo, 
and Peter James Hudson.6 Focusing exclusively on the war years, Wigley’s study 
offers the most detailed account of the personalities who gave rise to and sustained 
the annexation momentum, particularly in the latter years of the war. Canadian 
merchants, bankers, journalists, and politicians clamoured for a piece of the West 
Indies, as did some prominent members of government in Ottawa and London. 
4 “Confidential Memorandum upon the subject of the annexation of the West India Islands to the Dominion 
of Canada” (Ottawa, Dominion of Canada, 1917), pp. 2-3, 4, 5. While the provenance of this document was 
likely the Department of External Affairs (RG 25), it is catalogued separately in the library collections of 
Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC].
5 Harry J. Crowe, “Canada and the West Indies,” United Empire, October 1918.
6 P. G. Wigley, “Canada and Imperialism: West Indian Aspirations and the First World War” in Brian Douglas 
Tennyson, ed., Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1988), pp. 215-255; Robin W. Winks, Canadian-West Indian Union: A Forty-Year Minuet, University of 
London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Commonwealth papers, vol. xi (London: The Athlone Press, 
1968); Brinsley Samaroo, “The Politics of Disharmony: The Debate on the Political Union of the British 
West Indies & Canada, 1884-1921,” Revista Interamericana, vol. 7, no. 1 (1977), pp. 46-59; Peter James 
Hudson, “Imperial Designs: The Royal Bank of Canada in the Caribbean,” Race and Class, vol. 52, no. 
33 (2010), pp. 33-48. Other studies on the subject include Paula Pears Hastings, “Dreams of a Tropical 
Canada: Race, Nation, and Canadian Aspirations in the Caribbean Basin, 1883-1919” (PhD dissertation, 
Duke University, 2010); Alice Stewart, “Canadian-West Indian Union, 1884-1885,” Canadian Historical 
Review, vol. 31, no. 4 (1950), pp. 369-389; Andrew Smith, “Thomas Bassett Macaulay and the Bahamas: 
Racism, Business and Canadian Sub-Imperialism,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
vol. 37, no. 1 (2009), pp. 29-50.
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Prime Minister Borden found notable allies for the cause in Canadian Minister 
of Trade and Commerce George Foster, British Cabinet Minister Alfred Milner, 
Assistant Secretary in the British War Cabinet Leo Amery, and British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George. Borden’s representatives in Ottawa and London 
gathered information about the West Indies, culminating in the Department of 
State’s confidential report on the subject in 1917. The report, which concluded that 
Canada’s absorption of the islands was feasible and desirable, provided Borden 
and his ministers with a basis to advance the proposal formally at the Imperial War 
Cabinet meetings. These meetings generated a growing interest in the proposal 
in Canada, Britain, and the West Indies, prompting several enthusiasts to register 
their support in London and Ottawa throughout the remaining years of the war.7
 The annexation proposal ultimately failed, according to Wigley, due to the 
general chaos of the postwar period and the fading enthusiasm, by the fall of 1919, 
of formerly keen advocates. In “the frenetic and quite unprecedented activities of 
these postwar months,” Wigley writes, Milner and Amery were too busy to push 
the question at the Paris Peace Conference, and Borden certainly did not have 
the influence to do so. When the Canadian prime minister returned to Ottawa 
in May 1919, he was preoccupied with efforts to revive his weakened political 
position. He was, moreover, physically drained from his long European visit and 
spent the months leading up to his retirement in July 1920 convalescing. For the 
members of Borden’s cabinet who had earlier supported the annexation proposal, 
the financial responsibility of maintaining new colonies—especially the funds 
required for naval development—was not feasible in the economic depression of 
the immediate postwar period. Nor was there any clear sense of what Canada’s 
postwar role in the world should look like. Canada had won a seat on the newly 
formed League of Nations, but what exactly would this new role require? For many 
Canadians, Wigley concludes, “this new world of international affairs might be an 
uncomfortable place” wherein it might be best to avoid external responsibilities.8
 The records in Ottawa and London confirm a considerable interest in the 
annexation idea in the latter years of the war and indicate that this interest had 
dissipated by the fall of 1919. The explanation for this rise and fall is, however, 
more complex than Wigley’s study suggests. A product of the historiographical 
tradition that conceptualizes Canada’s imperial roles and responsibilities in the 
context of Canada’s relationships with Britain and the other “white dominions,” 
Wigley’s study does not seriously consider the import of the West Indies, and 
especially white Canadians’ racialization of West Indians, to the war-time 
negotiation of Canada’s position in the Empire and the world. Nor does it take 
proper account of the role played by West Indians like DeLisser in shaping the 
outcome of the annexation question. The purpose of this article is thus twofold: 
to interrogate the significance of the West Indies to the war-time discourse about 
Canadian autonomy in the Empire and to incorporate and assess West Indian voices 
in this discourse. In so doing, the article demonstrates that the war-time campaign 
7 Wigley, “Canada and Imperialism,” pp. 215-255; Hastings, “Dreams of a Tropical Canada,” pp. 176-216.
8 Wigley, “Canada and Imperialism,” pp. 231, 222-223, 244, 248-250; quotations can be found on p. 244 and 
p. 248.
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for a Canada-West Indies federation and, by extension, the struggle for Canadian 
autonomy were racially inscribed projects whose outcomes were contingent on 
the increasingly fraught relations between white Canadians and West Indians of 
colour. These fraught relations dampened interest in and ultimately quashed the 
possibility of federation by the fall of 1919.
 By inserting the West Indies and West Indian voices in the war-time discourse 
of Canadian autonomy, this paper places an important war-time social formation 
—the rise of black resistance and consciousness—in dialogue with a subject 
that is normally explicated in the analytic confines of diplomatic, political, and 
constitutional histories. To be sure, social historians have long since broadened 
the war’s empirical terrain beyond high-ranking military officials and politicians, 
illuminating the roles and experiences of ethnic minorities, women, families, 
workers, labour groups, and Aboriginal peoples. Yet aside from the cultural-
political battles between French- and English-speaking Canadians to define 
Canada’s relationship with Britain—a battle that peaked with conscription 
in 1917—we have little sense of how the wider social and cultural formations 
produced by the war shaped the discussion about Canada’s evolving autonomy.
 Historians have long identified the First World War as “one of the great turning 
points in the evolution of the Empire.”9 For India and the dominions, the war 
prompted increased participation in imperial affairs and incited, in many cases, a 
heightened national consciousness. As Robert Holland has observed, Canadian, 
New Zealander, and Australian soldiers “blooded” a new nationality at the 
Front, while dominion statesmen fought for a greater voice in the conduct of war 
and the constitutional reorganization of the Empire.10 To those who popularly 
anthropomorphized the constituent parts of the Empire, Canada and the other 
dominions matured from “children” to “sisters” of Britain. Prime Minister Borden 
urged dominion representation in the Imperial War Cabinet, at the Imperial War 
Conferences, and in the British Empire delegation at the Peace Conference. Most 
significantly, he drafted resolution IX (introduced at the Imperial Ministers’ 
Conference in 1917), which identified the dominions as “autonomous nations of an 
Imperial Commonwealth.”11 The resolution called for the extension of dominion 
autonomy in domestic affairs to external relations, as well as a voice in imperial 
foreign policy.12
 The battlefields and councils of Europe were not the only spaces where 
Canadians negotiated their place in the Empire. This study foregrounds, more 
specifically, the significance of the world outside Britain and the other dominions 
to the war-time discourse about Canadian autonomy. In conventional studies the 
9 W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact 1869-1971 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1977), p. 181.
10 Robert Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War, 1914-1918” in Judith M. Brown and Wm. 
Roger Louis, eds., Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. iv, The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 119.
11 John Herd Thompson, “Canada and the ‘Third British Empire’” in Phillip Buckner, ed., Canada and the 
British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 97-98; Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, 
Empire to Umpire (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000), pp. 58-64.
12 L. W. White and W. D. Hussey, Government in Great Britain, the Empire, and the Commonwealth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 264.
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historical actors who work out Canada’s autonomous future are white Canadians 
and Britons, often in collaboration with white South Africans, Australians, and 
New Zealanders. The Empire’s non-white peoples and domains have practically 
no role in this discussion.13 Yet, as Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have shown, 
the ways in which Canada and the other “white men’s countries” negotiated their 
place in the world was predicated on their privileged (white) position along the 
“global colour line.”14 Subscription to this racial geography fuelled transnational 
racial solidarities and inaugurated what black intellectual W. E. B. Dubois 
derogatorily called a “new religion of whiteness.”15 Recent studies by Ryan 
Touey, John Price, and Peter James Hudson have shown how the racially inscribed 
world-views of Canadian politicians, diplomats, and businessmen shaped their 
policies and practices on the world stage.16 Canadians with expansionist designs 
on the Caribbean claimed it was their racial prerogative to do so. Exercising 
this prerogative, which entailed not just administering the West Indies but, more 
importantly, “developing” them, would command international recognition and 
bolster (if only in a figurative sense) Canada’s autonomy.
 The global colour line was an insidious construct for several reasons, not least 
because it belied the ethnic plurality of “white men’s countries” and the fact that, 
to use Adele Perry’s words, “all colonies are ones of occupation.”17 Maintaining 
the fiction of Canada’s whiteness thus depended on restrictive immigration 
policies and the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples. Of course this was never a 
neat and tidy process, with immigrants and Aboriginal peoples always present not 
only to expose the veneer of a white Canada, but to challenge its very foundations. 
Imperial migrants from the other side of the colour line, such as British West 
Indians, proved especially problematic to Canadian immigration officials because 
these immigrants invoked their British subjecthood and their consequent right to 
fair play. Despite immigration officials’ efforts to obstruct this migration as much 
as possible, hundreds of West Indians journeyed north during the war.18 Many 
13 See, for example, Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, pp. 58-64; Richard Veatch, Canada and 
the League of Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975). There is brief mention of Canadian 
interest in annexing the British West Indian colonies in Margaret MacMillan, “Canada and the Peace 
Settlements” in David Mackenzie, ed., Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig 
Brown (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 397.
14 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
15 W. E. B. Dubois, as cited in Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, p. 2.
16 Ryan Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia, 
1957-1963,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 92, no. 3 (August 2011), pp. 429-454; Peter James Hudson, 
“Imperial Designs: The Royal Bank of Canada in the Caribbean,” Race and Class, vol. 52, no. 1 (2010), 
pp. 33-48; John Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2011).
17 Adele Perry, “The State of Empire: Reproducing Colonialism in British Columbia, 1849-1871,” Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History, vol. 2, no. 2 (2001), para. 5, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_
colonialism_and_colonial_history/v002/2.2perry.html (retrieved August 20, 2006).
18 Sarah-Jane Mathieu, North of the Color Line: Migration and Black Resistance in Canada, 1870-1955 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), pp. 100-142. See Dalhousie University Archives 
[hereafter DUA], University Senate, Meeting Minutes, September 4, 1917; Daily Gleaner [Jamaica], 
May 2, 1914, April 24, 1915, April 12, 1916, and April 12, 1917; Glenford Howe, Race, War and 
Nationalism: A Social History of West Indians in the First World War (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle, 
2002), pp. 29-40.
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encountered racist attitudes and exclusionary practices that sometimes turned 
violent. West Indians, often in cooperation with black Canadians and African 
Americans resident in Canada, organized in various ways to contest these racist 
practices.
 This mobilization of black organization and resistance is exemplified by three 
episodes of racialized conflict and contestation that embroiled would-be military 
recruits and students at McGill and Queen’s universities. Their struggles for racial 
justice were part of a broader pattern of black resistance during the First World 
War. As Sarah-Jane Mathieu has shown in her recent study of Canada’s black 
sleeping car porters, peoples of African descent in Canada established institutions 
and forged networks like never before, giving rise to “a tangible transnational 
race consciousness.”19 While these struggles for racial justice were characterized 
more often by disappointment than by triumph, they laid the foundation for a new, 
organized form of resistance that exposed and challenged the contradictions of 
colonial rule.
 These episodes of racial conflict and the resistance they engendered among 
black subjects in Canada ultimately scuttled the possibility of a federation of 
Canada and the British West Indies. Herbert DeLisser’s hope in 1916 that the 
war would mitigate racial differences and prompt a readjustment of imperial 
relationships along more homogeneous lines was dashed in 1918-1919 by the 
marked exacerbation of racial tensions and inequalities—at home in Jamaica, in 
Canada, and overseas. He came to expect that a federation with Canada would 
indeed do violence to the feelings of West Indians. Like millions of other colonial 
peoples, thousands of West Indians contributed to the Allied cause in France, 
northern Africa, and the Middle East, and they did so with the expectation of 
greater political representation and autonomy after the war.20 Peoples of colour 
in self-governing societies were similarly eager to do their part in the war and 
were equally invested in postwar change. Yet, in the face of mounting adversity 
and racial animosity during and immediately following the war, this optimism 
was replaced with disillusionment and contempt for colonial rule. The war-time 
struggles of West Indians in Canada exposed white Canadian sentiments toward 
peoples of colour, while the form of governance envisioned in Ottawa—territorial 
rather than provincial status, a limited franchise, and restricted mobility to 
continental Canada—was grossly incompatible with the emerging transnational 
consciousness of Canada’s black subjects.
Negotiating Autonomy and Governance across the Global Colour Line
“If the West Indies were brought into the Confederation,” the editor of Montreal’s 
By-Water Magazine wrote in March 1917, “we should have semi-tropical and 
19 Mathieu, North of the Color Line, p. 140.
20 See, for example, Michael Adas, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the 
Civilizing Mission Ideology,” Journal of World History, vol. 15, no. 1 (2004), pp. 31-63; Judith M. Brown, 
War and the Colonial Relationship: Britain, India, and World War I (New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1978); 
John Gallagher, “Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 3 
(1981), pp. 355-368; Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Oakland, 
CA: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 175-176.
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tropical territories which would make us completely self-sustaining.” It would 
“greatly augment” not only Canada’s commercial capabilities, but its “political 
importance” as well.21 Taking responsibility for West Indians of colour was central 
to this process. As Toronto-based timber baron Harry J. Crowe unabashedly 
declared, “Do not let us be ‘Little Canadians,’ but rather Expansionists in the 
broadest sense of the word. Let us do what lies in our power to bring about the 
confederation of Canada and the B. W. I. Let us assist in the developments of 
our brothers of a darker race, and add to our borders what is an almost tropical 
dominion.” Broadening Canada’s national outlook and prestige, according to 
Crowe, required the dominion to take responsibility for both the economic 
development of the West Indies and the cultural development of its diverse 
populations.22
 As the histories of the European powers were alleged to demonstrate, acquiring 
and administering colonial territories were more than prerequisites to domestic 
economic growth. Assuming responsibility for the development of the hundreds 
of thousands of dark-skinned and thus (by the logic of early twentieth-century 
Anglo-Saxon racial pretension) socially and intellectually challenged West 
Indians would boost the dominion’s autonomy and go a long way in establishing 
Canada’s international profile. It would, according to the Department of State, 
add “considerably to the importance and influence of the Dominion.”23 Canada 
might, in effect, become an empire in its own right. “The responsibilities of 
governing subject races,” Prime Minister Borden remarked in June 1916, “would 
probably exercise a broadening influence upon our people as the Dominion thus 
constituted would closely resemble in its problems and its duties the Empire as 
a whole.”24 Administering “a territory largely inhabited by backward races,” he 
wrote in a subsequent correspondence, would provide Canada’s public service 
with invaluable training.25 As By-Water Magazine put it, Canada’s annexation of 
the West Indies would birth an “Empire within an Empire.”26 The Department of 
Trade and Commerce’s Watson Griffin, who had furnished the trade statistics for 
the confidential memorandum, was more explicit in modelling Canada’s imperial 
trajectory on that of Britain’s. Comparing the British Raj’s United Provinces of 
Agra and Oudh to the potential of British Guiana, Griffin hinted that Guiana could 
become for Canada what India was to Britain.27
 A rich and growing body of feminist, post-colonial, and anti-racist scholarship 
has underscored the constitutive function of exclusionary rhetoric and practices 
to Canada’s national formation(s). Euro-Canadians, particularly British settlers 
and immigrants, have historically defined the nation in opposition to a racialized 
21 “A larger Canadian Confederation,” By-water Magazine [Montreal], March 1917, p. 5.
22 Harry J. Crowe, “Commercial Union with the West Indies or Confederation?” Canada-West Indies 
Magazine [Montreal], December 1916—January 1917, p. 632; The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom [hereafter TNA], CO 318/352, folio 278, Harry J. Crowe to Colonel de Satgé, July 14, 1919.
23 “Confidential Memorandum,” p. 4.
24 LAC MG26-H, vol. 70, Robert Borden to George Perley, June 3, 1916.
25 LAC MG26-H, vol. 70, Borden to Keefer, January 1, 1919.
26 “A Larger Canadian Confederation,” By-Water Magazine [Montreal], March 1917, p. 5.
27 Watson Griffin, “Why Canada Should Pay Attention to the West Indies,” By-Water Magazine [Montreal], 
October 1916, p. 30.
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Other, whether this Other resides within or outside the nation-state’s borders.28 
Hardly unique to Canada, such racialization is a defining feature of modern 
nation-states, one rooted, Sunera Thobani writes, in Western ontologies that “have 
long been based on binary constructions with the self being constituted in relation 
to its excluded Other.”29 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Europe’s colonial 
powers defined national sovereignty in large part through the colonial encounter 
and especially the racial and cultural distinctions this encounter generated.30 To 
Canada’s British settlers, who maintained an abiding respect for British culture 
and the work of Empire, Britain’s Crown colonies and dependencies similarly 
provided a logical Other to fuel their own nation-building projects. The British 
West Indies were a particularly useful referent given their geographical proximity 
to Canada and the long-established commercial ties between the two regions.
 For white Canadians with expansionist designs on the Caribbean, the British 
West Indies were formative to Canada’s evolution in the British Empire. Their 
racialization of West Indians, achieved primarily through paternalist rhetoric and 
practices, was central to this process. Paternalism, to draw from Mary Renda’s 
definition, “was an assertion of authority, superiority, and control expressed in the 
metaphor of a father’s relationship with his children. It was a form of domination, 
a relation of power, masked as benevolent by its reference to paternal care and 
guidance, but structured equally by norms of paternal authority and discipline.”31 
While white Canadian annexationists—offspring of Empire themselves—
preferred the “big white brother” trope to a parental one, their anticipated relations 
with West Indians of colour following the proposed federation were nonetheless 
structured by a paternalist model. This paternalism found expression principally 
in the interconnected rhetorics of colonial development and governance.
28 This body of work is too voluminous to include here. As a starting place, see Eva Mackey, The House 
of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada (London: Routledge, 1999); Himani 
Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender (Toronto: 
Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2000); Franca Iacovetta, ed., A Nation of Immigrants: Women, Workers, and 
Communities in Canadian History, 1840s-1960s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), especially 
pp. 359-445; Robert Adamoski, Dorothy E. Chunn, and Robert Menzies, eds., Contesting Canadian 
Citizenship: Historical Readings (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2002); Sunera Thobani, Exalted 
Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2007); Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta, “Making Aboriginal People ‘Immigrants Too’: A Comparison 
of Citizenship Programs for Newcomers and Indigenous Peoples in Postwar Canada, 1940s-1960s,” 
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 90, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 427-461.
29 Thobani, Exalted Subjects; Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967); 
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979); Stuart Hall “Introduction: Who Needs Identity?” in 
Hall and Paul du Gay, eds., Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 1-17; Sara Ahmed, 
Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (New York: Routledge, 2000).
30 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jonathan Elmer, On Lingering and Being Last: Race and 
Sovereignty in the New World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008); Edward Keene, Beyond the 
Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).
31 Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 15.
Territorial Spoils, Transnational Black Resistance & Canada’s Autonomy
452 Histoire sociale / Social History
 Like their European predecessors, Canadian annexationists argued that the 
development of the West Indies depended foremost on “a larger guiding hand of 
Anglo-Saxons.” On “all of the islands as well as on the main land the agricultural 
possibilities are enormous,” argued Montreal financier Andrew Drummond, but 
West Indians were thought incapable of initiating this development.32 Part of the 
problem, according to some annexationists, was that the West Indies’ current 
Anglo-Saxon guardian—Britain—was not fulfilling its responsibilities. The 
dwindled flow of British capital into the region, combined with Britain’s staunch 
commitment to free trade (which had left West Indian products unprotected and 
unable to compete), had devastated the colonies’ economies. The Managing 
Director of Canada’s Royal Bank, Edson Loy Pease (who had been the driving 
force behind the bank’s original foray and subsequent expansion in the Caribbean), 
agreed that the British West Indies possessed “the elements that would tend to 
cheap production—namely, a rich soil and cheap labor,” but they lacked adequate 
capital and guidance from Britain. The colonies produced about 200,000 tons 
of sugar in 1915, the bulk of which Canada absorbed, but they were capable, 
according to Pease, of producing 3 million tons per year. The suggestion of Pease 
and other annexationists that the British West Indies would realize this potential 
under formal Canadian control33 did not go unsupported in London. Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George agreed that Britain was unable to “develop all the 
vast territories of the Empire,” and he—along with Leo Amery, a member of the 
War Cabinet who would become Colonial Secretary after the war—encouraged 
Borden to take up such work in Britain’s stead. “The United Kingdom obviously 
cannot do it all,” Amery wrote to Borden in August 1918, “and the Dominions 
would naturally throw themselves into the work with greater zest if the connection 
were a direct one, at any rate as regards certain parts of the dependent Empire.”34 
Canada would have more reason, in other words, to invest capital and energy in 
the development of the West Indies under a federal arrangement.
 Visions of untapped tropical abundance, like Borden’s image of the West Indian 
colonies as “rich and undeveloped territories,” have long appeared alongside 
constructs about the indolence of “tropical races.” From the advent of European 
32 LAC MG26-H, vol. 70, Andrew T. Drummond to Borden, January 26, 1917.
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colonialism in the Americas, as Felix Driver and Luciana Martins observe, “the 
contrast between the productivity of tropical nature and the supposed absence of 
enterprise among its original inhabitants was routinely used to serve a colonial 
purpose.”35 For Canadian annexationists, these constructs justified the need for 
Anglo-Saxon (or more specifically white Canadian) intervention in the West 
Indies, while defining the terms of West Indian participation in this intervention. 
The development construct was thus forged at the intersection of liberalism, 
capital, and race; white annexationists positioned West Indians of colour astern 
in a temporalizing universalism that allowed them to justify and maintain 
control over the economic prospects of the region. In practical terms this meant 
that black West Indians were subject to what Uday Mehta has called the “not 
yet” phenomenon—not yet ready for greater autonomy and certainly not self-
government. Acquisition of these responsibilities, as Mehta observes in the Indian 
case, was “conditional on following a specific trajectory of development.” Until 
that time, Canadian annexationists argued, West Indians of colour had no business 
involving themselves in the political life of their respective colonies.36
 According to the Canadian Department of State’s 1917 report on annexation, 
admitting the West Indies in the federation under the same terms as Canada’s 
provinces and, in particular, granting them self-government was simply “out of 
the question.”37 For this reason, “confederation” was not appropriate. The report 
outlined: “There can be no confederation of the British West Indies with Canada 
at the start in the sense in which that word was used in the case of Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick half a century ago. There can be no equality of status at the 
outset.... ‘Annexation’ or ‘incorporation’ would more closely describe the initial 
process of admission into the union, under which they would become, as it were, 
‘Territories’ of the Dominion.”38 Guided by notions of white racial superiority 
and the principle of trusteeship, these recommendations outlined a form of Crown 
colony government similar to that already practised in many of the islands. The 
central change, of course, was rule from Ottawa rather than London. The report 
neither took account of nor even recognized the diversity of governance in the 
region, ranging from austere Crown colony rule to varying degrees of legislative 
autonomy and representative government. Barbados and the Bahamas, for 
example, had long operated under the old representative system, which included a 
legislative assembly as well as a council. For the most part, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Jamaica, and British Guiana remained Crown colonies until the interwar period, 
with varying concessions in the intervening years.
 Without taking account of West Indian opinion, the report concluded that 
Canada’s absorption of the islands was feasible and desirable. While all the issues 
outlined in the report presented challenges, none, “with the possible exception 
of the negro problem,” were insurmountable. To address this “problem,” the 
35 Felix Driver and Luciana Martins, “Introduction” in Driver and Martins, eds., Tropical Visions in an Age 
of Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 14.
36 Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 162.
37 “Confidential Memorandum,” p. 4.
38 Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
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report recommended territorial rather than provincial status and a restrictive 
franchise, which was consistent with Borden’s vision of federation. Other 
Canadian politicians differed in their recommendations. Minister of Trade and 
Commerce George Foster, for example, proposed few changes beyond a transfer 
of administration from Ottawa to London. Foster thought it appropriate to govern 
the West Indians under the same terms in force under British rule. Intent to avoid 
the appearance of exploitation, however, he maintained that West Indians should 
initiate the discussion.39 Former Minister of Finance W. S. Fielding was more 
reluctant to endorse annexation: “The whole mass of the inhabitants, it must be 
remembered, are not of the white race. A handful of white men from the Old 
Country have been remarkably successful in guiding and directing West Indian 
affairs and in enlisting the sympathy and co-operation of the native races, who are 
given as large a share in the business of government as circumstances permit.” 
So successful were they, in fact, that Fielding doubted whether Canada could do 
a better job. While he was willing to entertain the idea of political federation, he 
generally favoured a commercial union of the two regions.40
 Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom George Perley, on the 
other hand, expressed more serious reservations. Responding to a letter from 
Borden on the subject in June 1916, Perley wrote, “I have given the matter some 
consideration, and, while I see many things in favour of it ... I see serious difficulties 
in connection with the franchise.... I feel that [West Indians] would probably 
expect a good many more concessions from Canada in the way of political rights 
than they get from the Mother Country.”41 These concerns were not unfounded. 
The idea that West Indians could expect greater political rights in the Canadian 
federation was liberally propagated throughout the West Indies by Harry Crowe. 
During his many visits to the Caribbean he assured West Indians that federation 
would bring about a provincial government of the West Indian islands, with 
elected representatives in Ottawa. This assurance was visualized in an illustration 
that accompanied Crowe’s letter to the Daily Gleaner in May 1919 (see Figure 1). 
The illustration depicts a thoroughly paternalist relationship between “Big White 
Brother” Canada and the black West Indian labourer to whom he is extolling the 
benefits of federation. Brother Canada has two placards beside him outlining the 
political and commercial advantages of federation. On the “Political Advantages” 
placard we learn that “Provincial governments would handle local affairs as at 
present,” West Indians would have “representation in the federal government at 
Ottawa,” and there would be “no race prejudice.”42
 Crowe’s speeches to Canadian audiences, his articles in British and Canadian 
newspapers, and his correspondence with members of the Canadian government 
reveal a very different vision of union than the one he advanced in the West Indies. 
According to Crowe, white Canadians need not fear a common citizenship with 
39 Ibid., p. 5; LAC MG26-H, vol. 70, George Perley to Robert Borden, June 27, 1916; Harry J. Crowe, 
“Canada and the West Indies,” United Empire, October 1918, p. 427.
40 The Journal of Commerce, as cited in the Daily Gleaner [Jamaica], July 29, 1918.
41 LAC MG26-H, vol. 70, Perley to Borden, June 27, 1916, and September 15, 1916.
42 British Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Cd. 6092, Agreement between Canada and certain West 
Indian Colonies, dated 9th April 1912; and correspondence relating thereto, June 1912.
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West Indians, nor the increased migration of West Indians to Canada. Like Foster, 
he proposed a simple transfer of administration from London to Ottawa. Existing 
structures of local governance in the West Indies would remain unchanged. Canada 
would assume control over foreign affairs, tariffs, the post office, the marine and 
fisheries departments, and public works, allowing “limited but adequate” West 
Indian representation in these areas. More importantly, the restrictive West Indian 
franchises would not be synchronized with Canada’s more liberal franchise: 
“There is no demand for extending the vote there, and there is no reason why 
there should be in the future, unless the development of the people justified it.” 
West Indians would be similarly disinclined, Crowe argued, to migrate to Canada: 
“Because of climatic conditions prevailing in Canada, the coloured population 
of the B.W.I. would never invade our Dominion.” Many persons of colour who 
migrated to Canada during the American Civil War had, after all, returned to the 
southern United States when peace was restored. This was, in Crowe’s logic, 
compelling evidence that “darker races” were unsuited to “temperate and frigid 
zones.” West Indians would be less likely to leave the region, moreover, because 
union would stimulate agricultural and industrial development and consequently 
increase the demand for labour.43
43 LAC MG26-H, vol. 70, Crowe to Borden, September 13, 1916, and Crowe to Loring Christie, November 26, 
1919; Harry J. Crowe, “Canada and the West Indies,” United Empire, October 1918, p. 428; “Harry J. 
Figure 1: Daily Gleaner, May 3, 1919
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 During the war, however, many West Indians did leave the Caribbean to take 
advantage of opportunities in Canada. Companies such as Sydney’s Dominion 
Steel and Coal Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway ignored the informal 
strictures against recruiting workers of colour and actively sought black labour 
from the West Indies and the United States, while Canadian universities expanded 
their recruitment efforts in the West Indies to offset the loss of enlisted students.44 
Resistance to the formation of a black West Indies regiment for overseas service 
in the British War Office and the Colonial Office prompted eager West Indians 
to make their own way to England or Canada to enlist. By the time a British 
West Indies Regiment (BWIR) was approved in May 1915, many West Indians 
had already enlisted elsewhere.45 Several joined fighting battalions with white 
Canadian soldiers, while discrimination forced others to wait, once again, for the 
formation of an all-black labour battalion in the summer of 1916.
 While this migration may have proved inconvenient for white annexationists 
like Crowe, it alone did not threaten to derail the annexation proposal. More 
detrimental was the resistance of these new migrants to the racist attitudes and 
practices they encountered in Canada. Unwilling to abide this discrimination, 
particularly amidst the egalitarian rhetoric bantered about during the war, West 
Indians established periodicals to articulate their claims for equality, formed 
protective associations, and appealed to their imperial and colonial governments 
for redress. In the process, they made plain to white Canadians and especially the 
government at Ottawa that racial discrimination would not be tolerated.
Organizing for Racial Justice across the Global Colour Line
In the months following the outbreak of war in August 1914, tens of thousands of 
men flocked to Canadian recruiting stations to enlist. Hundreds of black Canadians 
and West Indians were among them. While the Department of Militia and Defence 
set no racial restrictions, black Canadians (like Aboriginal peoples and those of 
Japanese, Chinese, and South Asian descent) faced considerable discrimination 
in their efforts to enlist.46 Military officials across Canada advised against placing 
black and white men in the same regiment,47 and recruiting officers routinely sent 
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black volunteers away, claiming the conflict was “a white man’s war.”48 These 
concerns echoed those of Britain’s Army Council and War Office. The Council 
strenuously opposed placing black soldiers in white combat units, while the War 
Office preferred to employ blacks in non-combatant, labour units.49 In the British 
dominions, this opposition was partly rooted in the fear that combatant service 
would entitle peoples of colour to political or constitutional concessions and thus 
destabilize white hegemony.50
 As Sarah-Jane Mathieu has shown, rejected recruits and their supporters did not 
sit idly by in the face of this discrimination. They appealed directly to their members 
of parliament, the Department of Militia and Defence, and Britain’s representative 
in Canada, the governor general. The black Canadian newspaper The Canadian 
Observer, run by Canadian-born J. R. B. Whitney, launched a vigorous protest 
campaign that went a long way in pressuring authorities in Ottawa to approve 
the formation of a segregated black construction battalion in July 1916. Mathieu 
argues persuasively that these protests gave rise to a transnational “infrastructure” 
of organized resistance that laid a critical foundation for racial justice struggles 
after the war. While West Indians appear intermittently in Mathieu’s study, the 
infrastructure she investigates—the race-based friendly societies, commercial 
associations, and “racial uplift” groups—were led and primarily populated by 
black Canadians and African Americans.51
 West Indians in Canada were no less active in organizing for racial justice 
during the war. Halifax-based West Indians founded the Atlantic Advocate in 
April 1915, a monthly journal “devoted to the interests of colored people in the 
Dominion generally,” but especially to those in the Maritimes.52 Wilfred Alleyne 
DeCosta, a Jamaican-born gardener and collection agent who had immigrated 
to Nova Scotia around 1908, was the Advocate’s president and associate editor, 
and his wife Miriam served as secretary. Editorial responsibilities were taken 
on in 1916 by Ethelbert L. Cross, originally of San Fernando, Trinidad, and the 
following year by Dr. Clement C. Ligoure, a recent graduate of Queen’s medical 
school, also from San Fernando.53
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 Like The Canadian Observer, the Atlantic Advocate spent several months 
recruiting for the construction battalion and was always quick to speak out 
against racial discrimination. When the No. 2 Construction Battalion was denied 
the customary, patriotic farewell from friends and family upon its departure for 
Europe in March 1917, the Advocate admonished the military officials responsible. 
“Why,” Ligoure asked, “should our Race be huddled together in one mass, like 
cattle, marched from the Barracks to the train at Truro, then on arriving at Halifax, 
driven ... on board the outgoing transport without the last long good-bye to those 
near and dear to them?” Mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters, many of whom 
had travelled hundreds of miles to bid farewell to their loved ones, were denied 
the same privilege extended to white families. This unceremonious farewell, 
Ligoure continued, combined with a series of other discriminatory episodes since 
the outbreak of war, had fuelled considerable dissatisfaction among Canada’s 
populations of African descent. “[T]here is without doubt,” Ligoure warned, “a 
whirlwind of discontentment sweeping over the Dominion among the Colored 
population which would have been averted had they been given justice.”54
 Discontent spread in the late summer and early fall of 1917 when conscription 
came into force under the Military Service Act. Following Canadian Prime 
Minister Robert Borden’s trip to Europe in the spring of 1917, during which 
he visited the front and witnessed the devastation of war firsthand, he returned 
home determined to enact conscription for overseas service. He introduced 
the proposition to parliament on May 18, 1917, and the Military Service Act 
became law on August 29.55 Many black Canadians were outraged to learn that 
they would be drafted into military service after being turned away—sometimes 
multiple times—from recruiting stations in the preceding months. The issue was 
not conscription itself, but the humiliating and highly offensive discrimination 
that had predated conscription. Voluntary enlistment was widely understood as 
a patriotic and honourable duty. Denying black Canadians the opportunity to 
fulfill their service on this basis and then forcing them to enlist was considered a 
shameful betrayal of British justice and fair play.56
 The West Indian Trading Association of Canada (WITA) took a lead role in the 
protest against the conscription of black Canadians and other residents of African 
descent. Founded in Toronto in 1916 as an auxiliary organization of Marcus 
Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), WITA was a 
cooperative grocery and trading association with shareholders in Quebec, Ontario, 
and Nova Scotia.57 Despite its name, WITA’s membership was not confined to 
West Indians. Like the UNIA, its overarching objective was the “advancement 
of colored people.” As Trinidad-born WITA President Arthur E. King described 
it, the key to this advancement was organization. WITA solicited shareholders, 
established a produce trade with the West Indies, opened at least one grocery store 
54 The Atlantic Advocate [Halifax], April 1917.
55 On the history of conscription in Canada, see J. L. Granatstein and J. Mackay Hitsman, Broken Promises: 
A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977).
56 The Canadian Observer, September 8, November 17, and December 1, 1917.
57 The Canadian Observer, November 24, 1917; Winks, The Blacks in Canada, p. 414.
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in Toronto near Spadina and Queen, and purchased residential properties for rental 
to men and women of colour.58
 WITA members proceeded with the conviction that the “organization and 
commercialization of the race” would ultimately provide the necessary leverage to 
effect social and political change. “[B]y becoming commercialized,” E. Millington 
argued during a WITA meeting in December 1916, “we can make larger demands, 
can fight the immigration question, and all other questions along Race lines.” In the 
fall of 1917, WITA centred its protest against the conscription of black Canadians. 
Toronto members discussed alternatives to conscription at monthly meetings, sent 
delegates to confer with and gather support from WITA shareholders in Montreal, 
and presented their grievances to the federal government.59
 The Department of Militia and Defence largely ignored protests against 
compulsory enlistment. The Canadian Expeditionary Force suffered enormous 
losses in 1917, at Vimy Ridge in the spring and then at Passchendaele in the fall.60 
In Ottawa, concerns about the limited—or worse, dangerous—fighting capabilities 
of blacks and the “mingling” of black and white soldiers were blunted by an acute 
need for reinforcements. Like others who evaded the draft, Canadians of colour 
who ignored conscription notices and failed to present exemption documents 
when questioned by military officials were apprehended and forced into service.61
 Outside the Department of Militia and Defence, heightened concerns about 
inter-racial “mingling” prompted the enactment of exclusionary policies in a 
range of social and intellectual contexts, including restaurants, social clubs, and 
universities. During the war the medical schools at Queen’s and McGill placed 
restrictions on black students. Clinical instruction, usually conducted at nearby 
hospitals, presented a problem because white patients—many of them returned 
soldiers—refused treatment from physicians and medical students of colour. In 
1916, with the support of Queen’s University Senate, Dean of Medicine J. C. 
Connell prohibited the admission of prospective black students and expelled all 
15 black students in residence, most of whom were West Indian. In a community 
where “a great deal of prejudice against the colored race survives,” Connell 
explained, “the Faculty decided some months ago that it would not be possible to 
continue the education of these men.” Those expelled included students in their 
early years of study who were not yet in the clinical phase of the programme.62
 McGill admitted black medical students, but they were required to undergo 
their obstetrical training elsewhere, usually at a medical training facility in New 
York or Boston. The Montreal Maternity Hospital had closed its doors to black 
students a few years earlier, and McGill was thereafter unable to offer incoming 
black students the clinical course in obstetrics. McGill’s Faculty of Medicine was 
represented on the Medical Board of the Maternity Hospital, but, according to 
58 The Canadian Observer, December 9 and 23, 1916; January 13, 1917.
59 The Canadian Observer, December 23, 1916; November 24, 1917.
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Registrar J. W. Scane, the Faculty “had no voice at all in the management of the 
institution.” The “problem,” in other words, “was taken out of [McGill’s] hands” 
by the hospital’s restriction.63
 Not long after McGill barred its first students of colour from obstetrical 
training courses in September 1916, a group of West Indian medical students 
formed the Gamma Medical League. Aimed at “bringing together the men from 
various parts of the Empire for their professional, social and mutual benefit,” the 
League persistently contested McGill’s discriminatory policies. Following the 
unsatisfactory results of their discussions with medical faculty and the registrar, 
the League sent a petition to McGill’s Board of Governors on October 21, 
“setting forth [their] position and praying for redress.” University Principal 
William Peterson acknowledged receipt of their petition at the end of October, but 
informed them that it would be “quite some time” before the body that considered 
student petitions, the University Corporation, reconvened. When the petitioners 
received no response in the following weeks, they confronted Peterson in person 
to “enquire as to the fate of their attempt to get justice.” Peterson informed them 
the petition had been referred to the medical faculty. The students then met with 
Registrar Scane in January 1917, who assured them that arrangements would be 
made to facilitate obstetrics and gynaecology courses for black students.64
 When the League had not yet received confirmation in June 1917 that such 
arrangements would be made, members broadened their forum of protest to 
the West Indies. They sent letters to several prominent newspapers, including 
Jamaica’s Daily Gleaner, the Jamaica Times, Demerara’s Daily Argosy, and the 
Barbados Advocate.65 Emphasizing the importance of protest and perseverance in 
effecting change, the League called West Indians to action. Change “will depend 
upon the interest you display in the matter to decide whether your children and 
your children’s children will be debarred from the education so indispensable to 
civilization.... [We] earnestly ask whether [you] can afford to remain indifferent 
and see the shrines of knowledge gradually closing their doors on the faces of 
[your] children.” West Indians resident in Canada were “on the spot” and could 
see more readily than those at home that the discrimination at McGill was merely 
“the thin edge of the wedge.”66
 The Jamaica Times was particularly vitriolic in its condemnation of McGill. 
It entreated West Indian governments to register their disapproval with the proper 
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authorities at McGill. They should highlight, in particular, how antithetical the 
university’s practices were to British principles of justice and fair play. Doing 
so would make McGill and “all the other Canadian centres that are inclined to 
follow the broad and easy road of prejudice” realize that “their native island and 
their fellow countrymen have no intention of looking on apathetically.” United 
action on the part of the colonial governments would, moreover, demonstrate 
West Indian solidarity against racial prejudice.67
 J. A. G. Smith, a black lawyer and member of the Jamaican Legislative 
Council, brought the issue before Council as early as April 1918. The Council 
subsequently sent an inquiry, by way of the island’s colonial secretary, to Registrar 
Scane. In Scane’s reply, he assured the Council that arrangements had been 
made with an institution in New York City where black students could undergo 
obstetrical training in the summer between their fourth and fifth years. Scane also 
emphasized the small minority of black students in the Faculty of Medicine, which, 
at present, met the “quota” of eight to ten. The implication was, of course, that 
it was unrealistic to expect McGill to go to great lengths to accommodate so few 
students. McGill’s arrangement, he added, was much more accommodating than 
Queen’s policy, which barred black students entirely from the medical school.68
 Queen’s discriminatory policy was met with similar disapprobation by West 
Indians in Canada and the Caribbean. Just as McGill’s Gamma Medical League 
had sent a petition to all the British West Indian governments, so too did the 
West Indian Club at Queen’s. Club President E. W. Reece similarly emphasized 
the importance of education to the “advancement of the colored race” and the 
hypocrisy of enlisting black soldiers to fight the cause of freedom overseas while 
discriminating against them at home. Reece and the other petitioners also underlined 
the incongruity of this discrimination and Canada’s interest in strengthening ties 
with the West Indies. After the war, Canada “is contemplating not only extensive 
trade relations with the West Indian islands, but [a] Governmental relationship 
as well, and it would appear inconsistent in policy that a Government which 
desires such intimate commercial and political relationships with another people 
should[,] through its institutions of learning[,] set up barriers against those living 
in their midst.” The Club urged the West Indian governments to intervene on their 
behalf by sending an appeal to either the Canadian government or the appropriate 
governing body at Queen’s.69
 The acting Colonial Governor of Barbados, T. E. Fell, went one step further and 
forwarded the petition directly to the Colonial Office in London. He outlined the 
implications of Queen’s discriminatory policy in a supplementary letter. Because 
there were no universities in the West Indies, he pointed out, it was crucial that 
67 Jamaica Times, as cited in The Canadian Observer, March 16, 1918.
68 Joseph W. Scane to the Acting Assistant Colonial Secretary, Jamaica, June 10, 1918; G. M. Wortley to 
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Jamaica: The Politics of Rebellion (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1990), p. 99.
69 TNA, CO 28/293, The West Indian Club of Queen’s University to the Officer Administering the 
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West Indian students continue to have access to universities overseas. If Canadian 
universities continued to bar (or place restrictions on) West Indian students, 
Fell argued, these actions were “liable to provoke keen resentment amongst the 
coloured people of Barbados” and ultimately “induce a feeling of estrangement” 
towards Canada.70
 The Colonial Office agreed that discrimination against West Indian students 
at Canadian universities was sure to provoke resentment. It was, as one colonial 
official remarked, a particularly “unfortunate time for embittering the colour 
feeling,” given that thousands of West Indians were fighting (or had fought) the 
Allied cause in France, northern Africa, and the Middle East.71 Yet, at the same 
time, the Colonial Office recognized there was little it could do to check racial 
discrimination in Canada. As a self-governing dominion, Canada controlled its 
domestic affairs, which included the discretion to exclude imperial (non-white) 
subjects from other parts of the Empire. Debates over imperial migration and 
citizenship only a few years earlier, centred on Indian mobility in the Empire, 
had (re)confirmed this autonomy. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, dominion 
resistance to imperial citizenship schemes had compelled the British government 
to “accept the principle that each of the Dominions must be allowed to decide 
for itself which elements it desires to accept in its population.”72 If the imperial 
government conceded autonomy in immigration, it was certainly not in a position to 
influence—at least not formally—the admission policies of Canadian universities.
 The imperial and West Indian governments were unable to intervene on 
behalf of the student petitioners to eradicate the discriminatory policies at 
McGill and Queen’s. Yet the petitioners’ protests were nonetheless significant 
because they laid bare the increasingly organized quality and transnational scope 
of black resistance in Canada. They exposed the alarming persistence of racial 
discrimination in Canada while making plain that this discrimination would not 
be tolerated. In doing so, their protests prompted West Indians and Canadians to 
question explicitly the desirability of a Canada-West Indies federation.
“Imperial Brotherhood” Denied, Canada-West Indies Federation Denied
Jamaica’s Daily Gleaner bluntly reported in June 1917 “that the McGill incident 
has dealt a terrible blow to the idea of closer union between these two different 
parts of the British world.” If Canadian universities continued to close the doors 
of their medical colleges to people of colour, this practice “would put an end once 
[and] for all to any possibility of closer political unity between the Dominion 
and the British West Indies.” McGill had “beyond doubt” wounded “the 
susceptibilities of millions of people” and would, in the future, “inflict hardships 
on scores of intelligent, well-mannered and entirely respectable men.” Until 
Canadian universities repudiated their narrow-minded policies and practices, 
70 TNA, CO 28/293, Fell to Long, June 4, 1918.
71 TNA, CO 37/262, May 14, 1918; TNA CO 28/293, June 4, 1918. On West Indian soldiers in the war, see 
Howe, Race, War and Nationalism.
72 As cited in Hugh Tinker, Separate but Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth-1950 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1976), p. 28.
463
West Indians would regard federation proposals with “strong aversion.”73 A writer 
under the pseudonym “ITALEAN” shared these sentiments in a letter to the editor: 
“It appears very strange to me that Canada should be wanting political union 
with the British West Indies, and at the same time raise the colour bar against the 
majority of the inhabitants of these islands.” Such a step was “sufficient to damn 
the scheme” for political federation with Canada.74
 The protests of West Indians in Canada were also taken under consideration at 
meetings of the Associated West Indian Chamber of Commerce, the Georgetown 
Chamber of Commerce in British Guiana, London’s West India Committee 
(WIC), and Canada’s Department of Trade and Commerce.75 In response to 
increased reports of discrimination against West Indians at the Canadian border, 
the executive committee of the Georgetown Chamber released a statement 
in its annual report of 1917: “The restrictions which have been placed on the 
emigration to Canada of coloured persons have been referred to in this chamber.... 
The restriction is not to this colony alone, as protests have also been made in 
Barbados. The feeling of the Associated Chamber was that this is not an opportune 
time to press the [union] question but it is one we will not lose sight of.”76 In 
June 1917, the Barbados Advocate admonished the Canadian government’s racist 
immigration practices: “The illegal discrimination now being practiced by the 
Canadian Authorities against coloured passengers from the West Indies to Canada 
is sowing the seeds of discontent which will be certain to ultimately develop 
into strong protest against closer connexion with Canada whether in the form 
of Trade or otherwise.”77 Canada’s trade commissioner at Barbados forwarded 
the article to Canada’s Superintendent of Immigration W. D. Scott and requested 
an explanation. “It is true,” Scott replied in a form letter sent to countless trade 
agents and boards, steamship company proprietors, and prospective West Indian 
migrants, “that our Immigration Act contains a provision that the Governor in 
Council may prohibit the entry of immigrants of any race, etc., deemed unsuited 
to the climate or requirements of Canada.”78 Immigration inspectors possessed 
the discretionary power to prohibit the entry of blacks, in other words, without 
explicitly restricting immigration on racial grounds.
 The WIC was similarly concerned that Canadian attitudes towards people of 
colour were detrimental to closer commercial and political relations between the 
two regions. WIC members had expressed interest in the possibility of a Canada-
West Indies federation during the war, but, like the Georgetown Chamber of 
Commerce, the committee supported the deferral of negotiations until Canada 
resolved its race question.79
73 Daily Gleaner [Jamaica], June 14 and 15, 1917.
74 Daily Gleaner [Jamaica], April 16, 1917.
75 Daily Chronicle [Demerara], Mail Edition, August 4, 1916.
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 West Indians resident in Canada were understandably more interested, and to 
varying degrees uneasy, about federation. While Canadian annexationists assured 
West Indians that Canada would welcome them with open arms and give them a 
voice in Ottawa, they simultaneously reassured white Canadians that restrictions 
would be placed on West Indian representation and northward migration. When 
Judge S. Rowan-Hamilton of the Supreme Court of the Leeward Islands advocated 
federation during his visit to Halifax in March 1918, The Canadian Observer 
highlighted the “stir among the natives of the West Indies who are in Canada as to 
the advisability of this move.”80 As residents of Canada, they were all too familiar 
with white Canadians’ attitudes toward peoples of colour. The promise of Canadian 
capital—leading to agricultural and industrial development, higher wages, and 
the ultimate prosperity and improved well-being of West Indians—was no doubt 
appealing, but West Indian experiences in Canada foretold a different future.
 In the twelve months following the Armistice, West Indians of colour 
interpreted and responded to these experiences—and white Canadians’ racism 
more generally—with much less tolerance. November 1918 marked the cession 
of war, but it did not witness an immediate ideological, constitutional, or political 
break with the past. History is much messier than such a break implies; there was 
change as well as continuity in the immediate postwar period. Colonial peoples 
and other subaltern groups remained hopeful that change would still come in the 
form of increased representation, autonomy, and self-determination. In March 
1919 black Torontonian and WITA president Arthur King still identified a Canada-
West Indies union as the best means for West Indians to obtain these concessions. 
He placed some faith in Harry Crowe’s promise that the West Indies would have 
proportional representation under union. Black Canadians had equal access to the 
franchise as white Canadians, so it was natural to assume that West Indians would 
too.81 While it would be an oversimplification to assume race unity across class, 
colour, and regional difference, the prospect of two million newly enfranchised 
Canadians of African descent probably appealed to some black Canadian 
advocates of race equality. Canada’s black population comprised less than two per 
cent of the population in 1919,82 and the federal legislature was not, consequently, 
an efficacious forum to pursue race reform.
 The Pan-African Congress, which convened in Paris—not coincidentally—at 
the same time as the Paris Peace Conference, provided a crucial forum for black 
peoples worldwide to discuss racism, colonialism, and proposals for reform. As an 
international delegation representing black populations in Africa, the Caribbean, 
and the United States, the Congress hoped to influence discussions about racial 
equality and colonial self-government at the peace talks. The Congress was “an 
opportunity that we should grasp,” black Canadian George F. Bon asserted in 
March 1919, “so that we may be able to press our demands with greater energy 
and influence.” To Bon, the social and political conditions prevailing in the West 
Indies exemplified the contradictions and injustices of colonial rule. They were 
80 The Canadian Observer, March 8, 1918.
81 Ibid.
82 See Winks, The Blacks in Canada, pp. 486-487.
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“a group of islands, rich in resources, and possessing men with educational 
qualifications equal to the best that Europe or America can produce, yet they are 
... undeveloped and divided, and with few exceptions the inhabitants suffer the 
burdens of taxation without representation.” With “representatives of the race” 
assembled in Paris, Bon concluded, now was the time for change: “How can we be 
denied the right to rule ourselves in our own lands when the ‘slogan’ of the Allies 
... is ‘democracy’ and ‘self-determination.’ It is inconceivable that the Allies will 
ignore their own avowed pronunciamento.”83
 Bon soon learned, however, that the white Allied powers convened in Paris 
would do just that. The Pan-African Congress was ignored and in some cases 
obstructed. The United States’ government refused passports to Paris-bound black 
activists, and the Congress’s manifesto, which entreated the League of Nations to 
acknowledge the right of all “civilized citizens” to take part in the political and 
cultural life of their respective states, fell on deaf ears.84 The outcome of the Peace 
Conference, especially the defeat of the racial equality clause in the League of 
Nations covenant, incited worldwide disillusionment.85 Tabled by the Japanese 
delegates, the clause stated that, because the “equality of nations” was a basic 
principle of the League of Nations, League members should “agree that concerning 
the treatment and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories, they will not 
discriminate, either in law or in fact, against any person or persons on account 
of his or their race or nationality.”86 Japanese delegate Baron Makino echoed the 
aspirations of non-white peoples worldwide when he stated that “different races 
have fought together on the battlefield, in the trenches, on the high seas, and they 
have helped each other and brought succour to the disabled, and have saved the 
lives of their fellow men irrespective of racial differences.” These unprecedented 
experiences, he concluded, had set the tone for a new world order based on racial 
equality.87 The clause was defeated on April 13, however. As Marilyn Lake and 
Henry Reynolds point out, the dominions—Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, 
and especially Australia—played a significant role in this defeat. Granted separate 
representation at Versailles (as part of the British delegation), the dominions 
staunchly opposed the clause for fear it might encourage Asian immigration to 
their respective countries.88
 The riots, strikes, and general unrest that characterized demobilization 
and the return home of hundreds of thousands of servicemen compounded the 
disillusionment generated by the Paris disappointments. White skilled workers 
83 The Canadian Observer, March 1 and 11, 1919.
84 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, pp. 306-308.
85 The Canadian Observer, February 22 and March 1, 1919. Thoughtful summaries of the peace negotiations 
include Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, and Susan Pederson, “Settler Colonialism at 
the Bar of the League of Nations” in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, eds., Settler Colonialism in the 
Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 113-136.
86 As cited in Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, pp. 289. See also Thomas W. Burkman, 
Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2008), pp. 80-86.
87 As cited in Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, p. 291.
88 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, pp. 297-298. See also MacMillan, “Canada and the 
Peace Settlements,” p. 400.
Territorial Spoils, Transnational Black Resistance & Canada’s Autonomy
466 Histoire sociale / Social History
were in most cases granted priority in the demobilization timeline. The Black 
West Indies Regiment, Canada’s No. 2 Construction Battalion, and working-
class white servicemen waited in overcrowded European camps for several 
months before they returned home. As Sarah-Jane Mathieu observes, race riots 
broke out throughout the winter, spring, and early summer, exposing Canada’s 
“preoccupation with race and class to the Empire and the world.” These riots 
made clear that the war “had done little to equalize Canadian society.”89
 This mass unrest and general lawlessness continued when servicemen returned 
home. White Canadian veterans were livid to find their jobs had been (or might 
be) filled by “coloured” labour, while black West Indians, still smarting from 
their experiences in Europe, returned home to mass unemployment and dire 
living conditions.90 The significance of the war for West Indians, argues Glenford 
Howe, “lay not so much in the novelty of its impact as in the unprecedented way 
it exacerbated underlying tensions and contradictions implicit” in West Indian 
societies.91 Manifest in the strikes, lootings, riots, and other violent disturbances 
throughout the spring, summer, and fall, these tensions undermined existing 
structures of colonial rule and, by extension, the prospect of a Canada-West Indies 
union.
 Dr. Robert M. Stimpson, a black Jamaican who had graduated from Quebec’s 
Bishop’s University in 1898 with a medical degree, had a very different opinion 
of Canada in May 1919 than he did two years earlier. In May 1917, Stimpson had 
dismissed West Indian concerns about racial discrimination at McGill on the basis 
that Montreal’s population was, relative to other Canadian cities, un-British.92 By 
May 1919, however, Stimpson was more aware of the broad scope of Canada’s 
“colour bar.” This scope was particularly alarming in the context of Canada’s 
Loyalist history. Anyone with knowledge of the Underground Railway or Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin would hardly imagine that Canada had 
“become such a degenerate as to close the doors of its seats of learning” to peoples 
of African descent, Stimpson wrote. Highlighting the contradictions inherent 
in Enlightenment notions of progress (more acute in the postwar climate), he 
continued, “But such it is in this twentieth century of our boasted civilization!”93 
A closer relationship between Canada and the West Indies could only be forged if 
the dominion reformed its racist outlook: “Canada must be prepared to come with 
clean hands, and ample and sufficient guarantees that it has mended its ways.” 
Jamaicans, he elaborated, were sensitive to any sign of racial discrimination. 
As a people of integrity and honour, they expected the same courtesies that any 
civilized community would expect from another. Having “failed to comply with 
these simple observances,” Canadians should not be surprised if they “are taken at 
a discount” by West Indians.94
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 The principle of self-determination, liberally propagated by American President 
Woodrow Wilson in the spring and summer of 1919, left a lasting impression 
on colonial subjects world-wide. Erez Manela argues persuasively that colonial 
peoples in Egypt, India, China, and Korea shrewdly appropriated Wilson’s rhetoric 
in ways that “would help them gain the right to self-determination.” Middle-class 
West Indians similarly deployed this rhetoric. When a minister in Lloyd George’s 
government suggested that Britain relinquish several West Indian colonies to the 
United States to help settle Britain’s war debt, Trinidadian Kathleen I. Liddelow 
was livid: “Whatever the reason may be, one may well express astonishment 
that the ink of the Peace Treaty has hardly dried before the principle of self-
determination of which we have heard so much lately is apparently forgotten.”95 
In the wake of what Manela calls the “Wilsonian moment,” Liddelow was 
understandably outraged at the suggestion that Britain might cavalierly barter its 
West Indian colonies without even consulting West Indians.
 Rothermere’s suggestion was thoroughly out of touch with the emerging 
political and social milieu in the West Indies. So too was the idea of a Canada-
West Indies union. Many commentators who had been previously sceptical of 
union for commercial reasons were, by the latter half of 1919, opposed on racial 
grounds. These opponents included the West India Committee, the Jamaica 
Imperial Association, President of the Associated West Indian Chambers of 
Commerce Edward Davson, and Gideon Murray, British Member of Parliament 
and former administrator of St. Vincent and St. Lucia.96 Even those who had been 
keenly interested in union during the war, most notably Leo Amery and Robert 
Borden, were now dubious. Amery’s earlier contention that the West Indies were 
Canada’s “birthright” was no longer politically or constitutionally appropriate. 
By June 1919 his enthusiasm was considerably subdued. When Harry Crowe 
urged Amery, now Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, to press the 
Jamaican government to send a delegation to Ottawa to discuss the union proposal, 
he politely refused. “I told Mr Crowe,” he informed his colleagues in the Colonial 
Office, “that while we were all in favour of Canadians taking the very greatest 
interest in the development of the West Indies and were in no sense opposing the 
idea of a closer union with Canada if the West Indies wished for it, we must be 
guided by their wishes and were not prepared to push them into it.”97 Borden had 
supported the union proposal as late as March 1919, and he had encouraged his 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Francis Keefer, to advance the proposal in 
Canada and the West Indies while he was in Paris.98 By May, however, Borden was 
no longer interested in pursuing union. Earlier that year, Borden had expressed the 
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concern that West Indians might “desire and perhaps insist upon representation in 
Parliament.” Because Canadian blacks were enfranchised, he feared West Indians 
of colour might “consider themselves equally entitled.”99 Following the events 
in Paris during the spring, Borden was no doubt assured that West Indians would 
indeed consider themselves “entitled.” He had been in Paris at the same time as the 
Pan-African Congress, had witnessed the controversy over (and actively opposed) 
the racial equality clause, and had returned home in May to heightened labour 
unrest, anti-immigrant campaigns, and racial violence.100 Moreover, Keefer’s tour 
of the West Indies had been disappointing. When he returned to Ottawa in the 
summer of 1919, he regretfully informed Borden that he had “found practically no 
sentiment in favour” of a Canada-West Indies union.101
 The most remarkable about-face in 1919 was that of Jamaica Daily Gleaner 
editor Herbert George DeLisser. In 1916 DeLisser had looked openly and 
encouragingly toward a postwar union of Canada and the West Indies, but his 
opinion had changed dramatically by the fall of 1919. “The West Indies would 
be for Canada,” he remarked in October, “but Canada would not be for the 
West Indies.”102 When British Colonial Secretary Alfred Milner encouraged the 
dominions to take on a greater political and commercial role with the colonial 
dependencies nearest them that same month, DeLisser published a vitriolic 
response. That the dominions were interested in forming closer relationships 
with nearby dependencies was clear enough, “But why? Not because they want 
to benefit the people of those colonies. What has Australia done with her natives? 
Slaughtered them off the face of the earth. What is South Africa doing with hers? 
Making them slaves—for the position of these unfortunate people is not far 
removed from that of slaves.”103 DeLisser similarly admonished Milner and Prime 
Minister Borden for assuming West Indian willingness to be an appendage of 
Canada: “The falsehood is being steadily propagated that the British West Indies 
would view such a transference with favour, and the next move will probably 
be a tentative suggestion by Sir Robert Borden that Canada is willing to assume 
her share of Imperial ‘burdens’—at the expense of the West Indian section of the 
Empire.” Citing articles in the Canadian Press such as “Jamaica Asks to be Joined 
to Canada” and “Prominent Speakers Claim Island on Verge of Ruin,” DeLisser 
deduced that “the Canadian looks upon us as shivering orphans, neglected and 
despised, asking for food and shelter.” If one were to believe the “busy scribes” 
in Canada, it would appear that Jamaica is “a very fair representation of Darkest 
Africa.” Milner’s misunderstanding of West Indian conditions and sentiment, on 
the other hand, was somewhat excusable given his busy schedule. DeLisser was 
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sure the Colonial Secretary would “drop the Canadian federation idea as though it 
were blazing hot” when he realized that the West Indies were not far from claiming 
the right to self-determination.104
Conclusion
Those who debated the problems and possibilities of the union question during 
the war were not simply responding to the geopolitical and economic pressures 
of a specific historical moment. They were negotiating the terms on which their 
particular national or imperial formations would take shape. War contributions 
were expected to reap postwar dividends for the Empire’s peoples in the form of 
increased political representation and autonomy. For Canadian proponents of West 
Indian annexation, acquiring territorial spoils and administering the “backward 
races” who inhabited them were a means to greater national autonomy in both 
the Empire and in a broader global context. While Canada’s autonomy in external 
relations was not officially recognized until the Statute of Westminster in 1931, 
this development should not be projected backwards to diminish the significance 
of the war on the national trajectory that many Canadians imagined in 1916-1919.
 By the time 1919 drew to a close, the union momentum had dissipated. The 
war had dealt a serious blow to the civilizing mission ideology, and the protracted 
process by which colonialism eventually became a dirty word was underway.105 
The postwar rhetoric of equality and greater autonomy for all the constituent parts 
of the British Empire—however conflicted this rhetoric may have been—was 
incompatible with new colonial acquisitions. In 1919 the ideal of self-determination 
did not mobilize West Indians to seek immediate independence, but it did mobilize 
expectations for an autonomous future. The strikes, riots, and general unrest of the 
immediate postwar period were critical to the development of reform politics and 
labour organization in the inter-war years. People of colour in the British West 
Indies fought hard for economic, social, and constitutional reforms, though with 
limited results. By the mid-1930s, increased material pressures on workers, social 
and racial discrimination, and the agro-commercial elite’s unwillingness to cede 
even marginal reforms incited labour rebellions throughout the region.106
 West Indians’ growing commitment to reform during the war nonetheless 
reflected an agenda that was thoroughly incompatible with a Canada-West Indies 
union. The struggles of West Indians in Canada had exposed white Canadian 
attitudes toward peoples of colour and had offered West Indians a rude glimpse 
of life under union. These struggles contributed to an emerging collective 
consciousness among West Indians that was increasingly anathema to white 
colonial rule—whether from Bridgetown, Ottawa, or London.
 Canada’s evolution in the British Empire was thus not informed solely by the 
cultural and commercial relations forged with Britain and the other dominions, 
but by an elaborate web of exchange that brought many Canadians in contact with 
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Barbadians, Jamaicans, and Bahamians, to name only a few. The specificity and 
variability of these exchanges in different contexts of Empire should remind us 
to interrogate the apparent affinities that bound the “white settlement” dominions 
and the metropole together. Indeed, through their movements across the global 
colour line, West Indians conditioned the discussion about and ultimately quashed 
the prospect of union. In the process, they altered the path along which Canada’s 
autonomy was defined and achieved.
